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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades throughout the Western United States, dozens of
collaborations between public and private stakeholders have wrestled with public
policy challenges involving natural resources. Water resources projects,
programs, and policies have been a frequent subject of these collaborations.
Using interest-based bargaining processes,' many of these groups have reached
consensus-based solutions to seemingly intractable disputes.
One western water challenge that remains unresolved involves the Colorado
River Delta. As described elsewhere in this symposium and by numerous other
authors,2 the once-thriving delta ecosystem has been reduced to a tiny vestige of
its former extent. Once-numerous species and well-established indigenous human
communities have dwindled. For some, their very survival is at stake.
In 2000, in response to concerns raised on both sides of the international
border, the International Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC") adopted
Minute 306 to the 1944 treaty governing the allocation of Colorado River water
between Mexico and the United States.3 That minute commits the parties to
exploring cooperative studies of the delta's ecosystem. In 2001, the IBWC held a
1. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
(2d ed. 1992).
2. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Water Management in the United States and the Fate of the Colorado
River Delta in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 107 (2003); Robert Jerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last
Green Lagoon: How and Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOLOGY
L.Q. 903 (2002); David Parrish, Note, Where Has All the Water Gone? Water Marketing and the Colorado
River Delta, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369 (2003); Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River:
Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819 (2000). See
generally CHARLES BERMAN, RED DELTA: FIGHTING FOR LIFE AT THE END OF THE COLORADO RIVER (2002).
3. Minute 306: Conceptual Framework For United States-Mexico Studies For Future Recommendations
Concerning The Riparian And Estuarine Ecology Of The Limitrophe Section Of The Colorado River And Its
Associated Delta, Dec. 12, 2000, available at http://www.ibwc. state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2006).
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bi-national symposium concerning the delta.' More recently, the IBWC has
created an advisory group to address ecosystem challenges in the delta of the
Colorado River The Colorado Delta Advisory Group, comprised largely of
technical experts, has met just a handful of times. To date, Mexican and U.S.
IBWC staff has entirely facilitated this committee.6
The IBWC's Delta Advisory Group's initial efforts appear modest. After all,
Minute 306 merely commits the two governments to:
" [E]stablish a framework for cooperation ... through the development
of joint studies that include possible approaches to ensure use of
water for ecological purposes in [the delta] and formulation of
recommendations for cooperative projects[;]
* [E]xamine the effect of flows on the existing riparian and estuarine
ecology of the Colorado River from its limitrophe section to its
[d]elta with a focus on defining the habitat needs of fish, and marine
and wildlife species of concern to each country[;]
[and]
* [Establish] a forum for the exchange of information and advice
among government and non-government organizations with an
interest in the affected area.7
Nevertheless, the Delta Advisory Group could form the nucleus of a broader
collaborative effort to address the delta's challenges and opportunities. One
prerequisite to such a broader collaborative effort is a frank assessment of the
conditions that are likely to lead to a successful collaborative. Without such an
assessment, the public and private stakeholders may make commitments of time,
talent, and money that are likely to fail.
This paper was prepared to provide background to participants in a workshop
held as part of the Pacific McGeorge Institute for Sustainable Development's
Conference on "Transboundary Ecosystem Restoration: the Role of Law, Process
and Lawyers."8 The workshop's purpose was to test and refine the initial working
assumptions regarding the likelihood of success of a broader collaborative
approach. In effect, this paper is a thought experiment preliminary to a fully
researched, interview-based assessment.
4. The symposium was held September 11-12, 2001, in Mexicali, Baja California. See www.ibwc.
state.gov/FAO/CRDS0901/EnglishSymposium.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
5. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
6. The Mexican Section staff contacts are Francisco Bernal and Antonio Rascon. The U.S. Section staff
contacts are Bernardo Olague and Carlos Pefia.
7. Minute 306, supra note 3.
8. Held February 18-19, 2005, at the Pacific McGeorge campus in Sacramento, California. See generally
www.mcgeorge.edu/intemational/global/sustainable-development/.
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Part H of this paper provides some background on collaborative public policy
processes and outlines an eleven-point assessment rubric. Part III identifies the
membership of three collaborative processes underway in the Lower Colorado
River region. Part IV applies the eleven-point assessment rubric to the Colorado
River Delta. It sets out, for workshop participant comment and refinement,
twenty working assumptions regarding the conditions for success of a
collaborative approach to addressing the delta's challenges and opportunities.
Part V outlines the steps that will need to be taken for a fully researched,
interview-based assessment.
II. COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESSES
A. Background
Over the past three decades, public participation in policy making processes
has undergone a revolution. Previously, public participation was limited and
highly formalized. For example, in agency rulemaking proceedings, the public was
limited to sending in written comments.9 Alternatively, in environmental review
processes, the agency would accept public comment on a draft environmental review
document. While agencies would generally respond to the comments or
critiques, '° in many situations the commenter would have little idea why a
particular suggestion or critique was rejected.
Tired of seeing the results of traditional processes successfully challenged in
court or legislatively overturned, agencies began to seek ways to build broader
support for their policies in the late 1970s. As part of these efforts, many began
to both broaden the types of public participation they sought and to move that
participation earlier into the processes. Thus, for example, federal agencies
conducting environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") started holding "scoping sessions" to seek public input into the key
issues that should be reviewed before the review was conducted." Agencies also
began conducting negotiated rulemakings, where the agency and the stakeholders
would attempt to reach consensus on the terms of a proposed rule-before the
rule was proposed to the general public. 2
9. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (rule making). Unless prohibited by agency rules regarding ex
parte contacts, interest groups were-and still are-permitted to lobby agency staff and executives directly. See,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that courts do not follow earlier cases finding
implicit APA limits on ex parte contacts in rulemaking). Such lobbying, however, takes place behind closed
doors and does not generally create opportunities for meaningful dialogue with persons holding different
perspectives.
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring only agency consideration of comments and a concise general
statement of the adopted regulation's basis and purpose).
11. 40C.F.R.§ 1501.7 (1977).
12. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1996) (negotiated rulemaking).
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The last ten years has seen an explosion of collaborative processes. 3 These
processes seek the active and effective engagement of the affected public
throughout the formation of a policy, program, or project proposal. Policy
collaborations have been undertaken at all levels of government-international,
'4
feea,5 stt,6 • 17
federal, state, regional, and local.'8 Additionally, policy collaboratives have
tackled a wide range of thorny subjects, from health care' 9 and education," to
transportation1 and water resources planning.22
Public policy collaboratives divide into two principal forms: consensus-based
and consensus-seeking. Consensus-based collaboratives seek complete
consensus, as defined by the particular collaborative, among the participants. In
these collaboratives, a proposal may not move forward as the group's proposal
unless it achieves unanimous consensus. Similarly, in consensus-seeking
proposals, the participants also strive for consensus, as defined by that process. In
contrast to consensus-based processes, however, where process fails to attain full
consensus, the degree of consensus and dissent is recorded and the process
moves forward to its next business. The decision-maker must weigh and balance
the strength of the consensus before reaching its decision.
Proponents and critics have debated the justifications and merits of these
processes. Proponents argue that collaborative approaches provide more
meaningful public involvement leading to more robust and implementable
solutions.23 Critics argue that the processes are slow, expensive, elitist, and
abdicate government responsibility.24
13. For a searchable database of collaborative projects, see http://www.cbcrc.org/php-bin/projects/
projectSearch.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
14. A ten-year collaborative negotiation has been underway in the Nile Basin, but membership has been
limited to member states.
15. See, e.g., California Bay-Delta Authority (federal-state collaboration with advisory committee),
www.baydeltaconsortium.org/about/members/CALFED (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
16. See, e.g., The California Water Plan Update 2005, http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Water Plan Update]
17. See, e.g., The Sacramento Water Forum, www.waterforum.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
18. See, e.g., The Sacramento Transportation and Air Quality Collaborative, www.sactaqc.org (last
visited Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Sacramento Transportation].
19. See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on Special Payment Provisions and Requirements for
Prosthetics and Certain Custom-Fabricated Orthotics (on file with author).
20. See, e.g., Proposed Rules: Department of Education, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,203 (Dec. 5, 2001).
21. See, e.g., Sacramento Transportation, supra note 18.
22. See, e.g., Water Plan Update, supra note 16.
23. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment.- An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389
(1997).
24. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke
Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L.
55 (1987).
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As these processes have spread across the country, a new field of process
experts has arisen. These experts generally combine facilitation and mediation
expertise. As professional neutrals, they specialize in the design and
implementation of the components of these processes.25 They work under
contract with one of more sponsoring public agencies. Increasingly, agencies are
seeking to build their own internal capacity to support, participate in, and
26
occasionally, to facilitate and mediate these processes.
B. Assessing the Possibility of Success
Before launching a consensus-based or consensus-seeking collaborative
effort, the sponsoring agency or agencies should thoroughly assess the
possibilities of success. Frequently, these assessments are conducted by third-
party neutrals, trained in collaborative policy processes. Neutrals will perform
background research and interview stakeholders and others familiar with the
issues.
One such group of neutrals, the Center for Collaborative Policy, considers
eleven points to assess the favorability of the conditions for a successful
collaborative process. 7 Rephrased as questions, these eleven points are:
1. Do issues focus on fundamental legal rights or societal values?
2. Are there potential areas for agreement, preferably with multiple
issues for tradeoffs?
25. See generally, DAVID STRAUS, How TO MAKE COLLABORATION WORK: POWERFUL WAYS TO
BUILD CONSENSUS, SOLVE PROBLEMS, AND MAKE DECISIONS (Beirett-Koehler Publishers 2002); JULIA M.
WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Island Press 2000); THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Lawrence
Susskindet. Et al. eds., Sage Publications 1999); GERALD W. CORMICK ET AL., BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE (National Round Table on the Environment and
the Economy 1996); BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY
PROBLEMS (Jossey-Bass 1989); SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND REACHING AGREEMENTS (Jossey-Bass 1988); LAWRENCE
SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
PUBLIC DISPUTES (Basic Books 1987).
26. Thus, for example, the Salton Sea Advisory Committee is currently being facilitated by the
Department of Water Resources. Where the sponsoring public agency is also a key stakeholder as well as the
ultimate decision maker, its ability to function as a neutral mediator among other stakeholders is severely
challenged.
27. See Center for Collaborative Policy, Conditions Favorable for the Initiation of a Collaborative
Process, www.csus.edu/ccp (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Center for Collaborative Policy]. The
Center for Collaborative Policy also details eleven "Conditions Needed to Sustain a Collaborative Process."
These are: 1) Clear Role and Purpose; 2) Transparency of Decision-Making; 3) Interest-Based Decision-
Making; 4) Every Effort to Bring Affected Stakeholders into the Process; 5) Stakeholders Represent Organized
Constituencies; 6) Upfront Exploration of Interests; 7) Common Understanding of Problems and Joint-Fact
Finding; 8) Policy and Technical Expertise; 9) Respectful and Authentic Process; 10) Transparency of Products;
and 11) Resources. Id.
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3. Are the primary parties identifiable and willing to participate?
4. Does each party have a legitimate spokesperson?
5. Are the potential deal-breakers at the table?
6. Does any party have assurance of a much better deal elsewhere?
7. Do the parties anticipate future dealings with each other?
8. Is there a relative balance of power among the parties?
9. Are there external pressures to reach agreement?
10. Is there a realistic timetable for completion?
11. Are there adequate resources and funding to support the negotiation?
Each of these questions is explored more deeply in the following section.
Negative answers to Center for Collaborative Policy Questions 1 and 6, and
positive answers to the remaining questions should largely be considered pre-
requisites to launching a process.28
C. Conditions Favorable to Initiate a Collaborative Process
1. Do Issues Focus on Fundamental Legal Rights or Societal Values?
Where fundamental legal rights or societal values are at stake in a public
policy controversy, consensus-based or consensus-seeking collaborative
solutions are more difficult, if not impossible, to reach. In these instances,
participants are often not even willing to speak with, or listen to, their
counterparts. Alternatively, they may perceive that their Best Alternative To a
Negotiated Agreement ("BATNA") is superior to any collaborative outcome.29
Even where dialogue about fundamental rights or values is possible, compromise
is generally not possible. Creative solutions that can bridge these diametrically
opposed viewpoints are infrequent.
Examples of such conflicts over fundamental rights and values are easy to
find. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, fundamental civil rights matters were
best resolved by courts and legislators. Today, issues involving rights
alternatively styled as "reproductive rights" or "rights to life" generally do not
28. In some situations, it might be possible to launch a collaboration even if the answer to Question 7-
Do the parties anticipate future dealings with each other?---or Question 3-Are the primary parties willing to
participate?-was "no." Question 7 raises the stakes for parties to seek solutions and to act in good faith. If
there are otherwise adequate incentives for the parties to reach a "one time" agreement, and adequate processes
to ensure good faith negotiation, a collaboration might still be launched. Similarly, with Question 3, as
discussed below, it is occasionally possible to start a multi-party process without one of the primary parties,
provided that party is not a "deal breaker."
29. See infra Center for Collaborative Policy Question 6, section II.C.6.
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permit interest-based solutions.30 Similarly, issues of same-gender marriages
likely do not permit easy interest-based solutions.
Neither the degree of emotion expended by participants on a dispute nor the
degree of entrenchment of their positions, however, is the proper measure of its
susceptibility to a collaborative, interest-based resolution. Many relatively simple
and highly resolvable disputes-for example, the placement of traffic calming
devices in urban neighborhoods-can stir up great passions and fixed positions.
But, the underlying interests of the different stakeholders can be often identified,
and solutions developed that address the different interests. Only those disputes
raising principles or values that are "off the bargaining table" are not, everything
else being equal, good candidates for collaborative solutions.
Cases involving endangered species, like all three of the Lower Colorado
River region collaboratives noted here, illustrate the interplay between
fundamental values and alternative solutions. An environmental organization
dedicated to species preservation and recovery is unlikely to agree to anything
that involves the extinction of a species.' But, so long as extinction is "off-the-
table," multiple approaches may well exist to protect the species in question.
These negotiable alternatives create the possibility for a collaborative approach,
as different stakeholders may value the trade-offs differently. In contrast, in a
dispute over reproductive programs, right-to-life advocates are unlikely to
support any funding for any program that provides abortions, while pro-choice
advocates are unlikely to support funding for any program that curtails a
woman's right to choose. The Lower Colorado Collaboratives are not hindered
by non-negotiable issues.
2. Are There Potential Areas for Agreement, Preferably with Multiple Issues for
Tradeoffs?
Before any agreement is possible, there must be a Zone of Potential
Agreement ("ZOPA") among the negotiators. For example, in a two-party
negotiation over a single variable-for example, price-the ZOPA will extend
between the parties' reservation values. These reservations are the highest price
the buyer is willing to pay, and the lowest price that the seller is willing to accept,
If the buyer's reservation value is higher than the seller's reservation value, a
ZOPA exists. With perseverance and negotiating skill, an agreement may well
ensue. However, if the buyer's reservation price is lower than the seller's
30. Collaborative specialists might help structure dialogues between groups with such opposing beliefs.
The goals of such dialogues are not consensus but understanding.
31. Assuming that the species was covered by the Endangered Species Act, such an outcome would only
be legally possible if the so-called "God Squad" was to approve extinction. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-(o)
(2000).
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reservation price, no ZOPA exists. In that case, no matter how much time or
negotiating skills the parties have impasse will result)2
Most public policy collaborations involve far more parties and far more
issues than the simple two-party example noted above. While the increase in the
number of parties makes reaching agreements more difficult, the increase in the
number of issues often makes reaching agreements easier. Multiple issues allow
parties to prioritize their concerns. The differences among priorities allow parties
to trade-off their lower priority items for higher priority items.
3. Are the Primary Parties Identifiable and Willing to Participate?
The sponsoring agencies must be able to identify the primary parties, and
those parties must participate willingly.
Primary parties break down into three main groups: deal breakers, deal
makers, and those non-deal breakers who are especially impacted by the policy
decisions. Deal breakers are those who have the power to block an agreement
from being reached or implemented. They are discussed more fully below.33 Deal
makers are those parties who have the power to get others to reach agreement.
That power may be rhetorical, political, economic, or social. They may also
control access to key resources-such as information or analysis-that are
necessary to get the parties to resolve data-based disputes. The third group-non-
deal breakers impacted by the policies under consideration-are often
traditionally under-represented in policy-making processes. A host of historic,
economic, and practical reasons can account for this under-representation. By
including the perspective and insights of those most affected by the policy
decisions, policymakers better ensure the robustness and legitimacy of any
resulting agreement.
In many situations, most of the primary parties are readily known to the
sponsoring agencies, forming a cast of "usual suspects" who are interested in the
policy matters under consideration. But, where the "usual suspects" leave out
historically underrepresented groups, or the agencies are developing very new
policies or very new solutions, a wider group of primary parties must be
identified.
Some members of this wider group may be identified during the pre-process
assessment. Others will need to be identified by the process participants as one of
their initial tasks. Occasionally, participants will not be identifiable until
proposed solutions begin to take shape.
Voluntary participation is essential because agencies cannot compel an
unwilling party's attendance in a policy collaborative. Reluctant parties may need
32. Of course, when impasse occurs, the parties can re-examine their BATNAs to see whether they have
properly evaluated these alternatives. As part of that re-examination, they may adjust their reservation values
and a ZOPA may result.
33. See infra Center for Collaborative Policy Question 5, section II.C.5.
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to be persuaded by the sponsoring agency to participate. Often, they will be
asked to commit to attend only the initial meeting to learn more about the process
and its desired outcomes.
Occasionally, an agency may choose to proceed absent a primary party.
Despite efforts to encourage their participation, these parties may decline to
participate for several reasons. For example, they might conclude that they have
the prospects for a better deal elsewhere; they may have higher priorities for their
limited resources; or they may simply be skeptical of the process, its participants,
and its chances for success. Provided these parties are not "deal breakers," their
absence may not prevent an implementable agreement from being reached,
though it may make the resulting agreement less robust. In other occasions, a
skeptical, recalcitrant party may belatedly decide to join the process once that
party sees that progress is occurring and decisions are being made without that
party's input. Collaboratives are replete with examples of parties who rush to
climb on board the policymaking train once they sense that that train is about to
pull out of the station.
4. Does Each Party Have a Legitimate Spokesperson?
It is not enough to identify the interests that need to be represented in the
collaborative. Nor is it enough to identify the particular parties that might
represent those interests. The sponsoring public agency must also make sure that
each interest is organized in a way that produces legitimate spokespersons
authorized to act on behalf of the members of the interest group. These
spokespersons are necessary to ensure the "buy-in" of the interest group to the
collaborative process, as well as to reduce the number of project participants
"around the table" to a manageable level.
Assurance of adequate stakeholder representation turns upon two factors: (1)
the number of entities or individuals within each interest group; and (2) the
degree of organization of these interest groups. On one hand, the least challenge
is posed where the number of affected interests is small, the entities representing
those interests are well-known and well-organized, and those entities have
designated representatives authorized to act on the entity's behalf. On the other
hand, the greatest challenge is posed where an affected interest group has a
diverse membership with no organizational structure. Intermediate-level
challenges are posed by groups undergoing leadership change, or where rival
leaders each claim to speak on the group's behalf.
Process facilitators can employ several tools to ensure the legitimacy of an
interest group's representative. For example, interest groups are often organized
into caucuses to help the group sort through its representation and decision-
making issues. Conflicts over spokesperson(s) identity can be minimized by
developing a clear understanding of the spokespersons' roles and obligations to
the larger group. A communications plan, whereby members of the broader
group are routinely briefed and consulted, is also essential to ensuring member
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buy-in to their spokespersons' representative work. An open meeting
requirement, whereby any interest group member can attend any meeting, will
also reduce concerns over the member's representation. Finally, multiple
representatives, alternates, rotating representatives, and "extended review" 3'
groups can also help resolve questions over representation.
Regardless of the specific approach they take, the process leaders must try, as
hard as possible, to have the group itself determine its official representatives.
Under no circumstances should the process facilitators or staff be in charge of
picking the representatives. Where conflict over representation cannot be
resolved within the interest group through any of the above mentioned tools,
leadership of the sponsoring public agency will need to make the decision about
the group's representatives. Depending upon the particular process involved, the
sponsoring public agency might seek the recommendation of elected officials, or
may reserve the decision for its own agency executives.
5. Are the Potential Deal-Breakers at the Table?
As noted above, deal breakers are those who have the power to block an
agreement or to block its implementation. If these parties are not part of the
negotiation, the sponsoring public agency runs a substantial risk that any
consensus-based agreement may be either blocked or may be reopened when the
deal breaker flexes its muscles. Identification of deal breakers comes from a
combination of the sponsoring public agency's knowledge, background research
by the process assessor, the assessor's interviews with knowledgeable persons
and stakeholders, and from the process participants once the process is launched.
6. Does any Party Have Assurance of a Much Better Deal Elsewhere?
Critical to a successful interest-based negotiation is each party's
understanding of its BATNA. In the public policy context, common alternatives
to a negotiation include legislation, litigation, conventional administrative
processes, elections, and referenda. Where a potential party believes that it has
substantially better alternatives to a negotiated resolution, it is unlikely to
participate willingly or eagerly.
Identification of a party's BATNA generally begins during the assessment
interviews. Frequently, process facilitators find that parties overestimate their
BATNAs and underestimate their counterparts' BATNAs. The term itself invites
some overestimation, as it seems to ask parties what their ideal result would be
were they not to participate in the negotiation. For this reason, the Center for
Collaborative Policy sometimes asks parties to focus instead on their Most Likely
34. While not participating as full project participants, extended review groups are routinely briefed by
the project leaders, and their input formally sought during these briefings.
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Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement ("MLATNA"). Others ask the parties to
consider their worst-case scenario-the Worst Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement ("WATNA")-if a negotiation is unsuccessful. However termed, the
assessor's role is to help the parties "reality test." If, after a full and frank
discussion of their "ATNAs," the parties remain convinced that they do, indeed,
have adequate assurances of a much better deal elsewhere, participation in the
collaborative is likely a waste of their time. If they are deal breakers with a good
BATNA, their absence may make the collaborative a waste of time for everyone
involved.
Even where identified accurately during the assessment phase, the "ATNAs"
are rarely static. During the collaboration itself, the parties frequently attempt to
strengthen their negotiation hand by either improving their BATNAs, or making
their counterparts' BATNAs less favorable. Negotiation process ground rules
need to clarify the parties' obligations, if any, to each other regarding these "out
of the negotiating room" efforts.
7. Do the Parties Anticipate Future Dealings With Each Other?
The greater the extent to which parties anticipate future dealings with each
other, the greater their incentive to find ways to meet each of their underlying
interests to avoid future conflicts. In the public policy context, regulatory
programs generally involve parties who will have future relationships with each
other. Those relationships may be as regulator and regulated, as competitors, or
as producers and consumers. Where public policy disputes focus not on a
regulatory program but on a specific project, there is greater chance that the
parties will view the negotiation as a one-time event.
8. Is There a Relative Balance of Power Among the Parties?
"Relative" is the key term posed in this question. Few collaboratives involve
parties with roughly equal bargaining power. However, power comes in a wide
variety of forms-for example, economic, political, persuasive, moral, social, or
religious. Power may also come from access to information or channels of
communication. During the process assessment, the neutral can help the parties
frankly assess their relative powers vis-A-vis each other. If each has at least some
substantial ability to affect other participants' abilities to meet their interests, they
hold enough power to be reckoned with.
The parties' understanding of their relative power is frequently linked to their
understanding of their BATNAs. As with their BATNAs, many holders of
conventional political or economic power may overestimate their own power and
underestimate that of their counterparts. Conversely, many interests that lack
conventional power may learn, to their surprise, that they have heretofore
unknown organizational abilities, strengths, allies, or access to resources.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 19
Although not every participant's power suddenly rises to the level of deal
breaker merely by joining the collaborative,35 a legitimate and robust process will
require the sponsoring public agency and other participants to help ensure
meaningful participation by all participants. Process design can help ensure that
all participants have their voices count, even those lacking conventional political
or economic power. For example, the information development and sharing stage
of collaborative processes equalizes access to information. Also, the sponsoring
public agency can help defray participation costs by those interest groups whose
organizations cannot easily afford such costs.
9. Are There External Pressures to Reach Agreement?
A tension exists between the elements addressed by assessment questions
nine and ten. On one hand, Question 9 looks for assurances that the parties will
have adequate incentive to keep the process moving forward. On the other hand,
Question 10 asks whether the pressures to quickly resolve the policy matter are
too intense to allow the parties the time necessary to honestly and meaningfully
collaborate.
External pressures to reach agreement can come from a wide variety of
sources. Frequently, the parties' BATNAs will provide that pressure through
pending or threatened legislation, litigation, elections, or ballot measures. Other
times, the external pressures may come from matters entirely outside of the
parties' control, such as the calendar or the seasons. For example, grant funding
to implement an agreement may expire on a particular date. Or, the parties may
need to resolve a water management measure before the next rainy season or dry
season. Absent such pressures or deadlines, however, the process can too easily
stall, as more pressing matters occupy the parties' attentions.
10. Is There a Realistic Timetable for Completion?
As noted above, Question 10 explores the converse of Question 9. While
external pressures are necessary to keep the process from stalling, if the timetable
is too short, the parties either may not reach agreement (for example, lacking
sufficient time to build broader support for their agreement) or the reached
agreement may be insufficiently robust to endure.
Collaborative processes typically run through five stages: initiation,
organization, education, negotiation, and implementation. It is both a strength
and a weakness that collaborative processes take substantial time to move
through these five stages.3' The strength comes from the time the parties get to
35. If the collaborative has a complete unanimity requirement, and no "stand aside" provisions, then any
participant has veto-power over the group.
36. Of course, the stages often overlap. And insights or impasses that occur in later stages may require
the group to revisit, in part, earlier stages.
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explore a matter in depth, develop constructive relationships with each other, and
gradually build agreement step by step. The weakness is that the processes may
take several years for complicated policy matters. Meanwhile, absent some
interim solution, the problems or issues that sparked the collaborative's initiation
in the first place will remain unabated or unresolved.
11. Are There Adequate Resources and Funding to Support the Negotiation?
The final question presents a bit of a "chicken and egg" problem to the
sponsoring public agency. On one hand, until the process is designed, the
question cannot be fully answered. On the other hand, without knowing what the
available resources are, the project cannot be adequately designed.
In practice, this conundrum is generally overcome by a thorough inventory of
likely available resources and an initial project sketch based on those resources.
The full extent of available resources and needs must be considered. These must
include: financial resources; technical, scientific, and process expertise;
administrative and logistical support; stakeholder time; and public agency
executive sponsorship.37 Research should identify contributions from both the
public and private sector stakeholders, as well as any attributable to third-parties.
Based on the initial resources survey, the process designer can outline a work
plan and budget. In an iterative process of identifying unmet needs and untapped
resources combined with creative process redesign, the designer can develop a
final design and budget for consideration by project sponsors.
III. COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS IN THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER REGION
A. Introduction
There currently are three major collaborative efforts underway in the Lower
Colorado: the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program; the
California Resources' Secretary's Salton Sea Advisory Committee; and the
IBWC's Colorado Delta Advisory Group. All are consensus-seeking processes.
37. "Executive Sponsorship" denotes the willingness of the sponsoring public agency's directors and
senior executives to support the process as an agency priority. This support can be manifested in a variety of
ways, including: the directors' or deputy directors' willingness to invite, welcome, and encourage participants;
receipt of regular briefings and provision of regular guidance; support for process budget requests; intervention,
as needed, to resolve intra- or inter-agency disputes; provision of regular briefings of top administration
officials and legislators; and critical stakeholder outreach to build acceptance for the collaborative's process and
results.
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B. Current Programs
1. Multi-Species Conservation Program
The history, goals, legal context and outcomes of the Lower Colorado River
Multi-Species Conservation Program ("MSCP") are addressed in Jeff
Kightlinger's paper within this symposium." Consideration here will focus solely
on the collaborative's membership.
The MSCP has the most extensive membership of the three Lower Colorado
collaboratives. Its twenty-seven member Steering Committee draws its members
from eighty-one participants representing thirty different organizations. 9 These40 • 41 • 4
include: federal agencies; Arizona, California,4  and Nevada 43 state agencies;
tribes;" local governments and agencies;4'5 businesses;46 and Non-Governmental
Organizations ("NGOs"). 7
2. Salton Sea Advisory Committee
While the MSCP is nearing the end of its program development, the Salton
Sea Advisory Committee ("SSAC") is still relatively new. With its initial
38. Jeffrey Kightlinger, The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, 19 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 33 (2006).
39. The three participating organizations that are not on the Steering Committee are the Colorado River
Commission of Nevada's Industrial Customers, Ducks Unlimited, and National Wildlife Foundation. The
project web page also lists eight consultants as project participants. None of these consultants are on the
Steering Committee.
40. The federal agencies are the Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of
Energy, and Western Area Power Administration.
41. The Arizona agencies are the Department of Water Resources, Game and Fish Department, and
Power Authority.
42. The California agencies are the Colorado River Board, and Department of Fish and Game.
43. The Nevada agencies are the Colorado River Commission, and Department of Wildlife.
44. The tribes are the Lower Colorado River Tribal Coalition, Colorado River Indian Tribes, Hualapai
Indian Tribe, Cocopah Indian Tribe, Quechan Indian Tribe, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, and Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe.
45. The Arizona local agencies are the Central Arizona Water Conservation District, Wellton-Mohawk
Irrigation and Drainage District, and City of Yuma.
The California local agencies are the Coachella Valley Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Palo Verde
Irrigation District, San Diego County Water Authority, Southern California Public Power Authority, and the
City of Needles.
The Nevada local agencies are Overton Power District #5 and Southern Nevada Water Authority.
An additional local government member of the Steering Committee is the Quadstate County Government
Coalition. The coalition represents Imperial and San Bernardino Counties, California, Lincoln County, Nevada,
and Mohave County, Arizona.
46. The businesses include the Nevada Power Company Silver State Power Southern California Edison,
and Valley Electric Association.
47. The NGOs are Trout Unlimited/B.A.SS., and National Wildlife Federation.
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meeting held in January 2004, the committee is a consensus-seeking body formed
to advise the California Resources Secretary on Salton Sea restoration programs.
It is currently being facilitated solely by the Department of Water Resources
staff. Ultimate decision-making authority remains with the Resources Secretary.
The history, goals, legal context, and intended outcomes of the SSAC are
addressed in Kim Delfino's paper within this symposium.4  Consideration here
will focus solely on the collaborative's membership.
The SSAC currently contains twenty-nine members. These are drawn from
49 50federal agencies, tribes,"' state agencies,5 local agencies, 2 and NGOs
3. IBWC Colorado Delta Advisory Group
The newest of the three collaboratives, the IBWC's Colorado Delta Advisory
Group, held its first meeting February 25, 2004. It has seventeen representatives
from Mexico and the United States. The nine Mexican representatives are drawn• 55 16 57
from federal agencies,' state agencies, an NGO,56 and local representatives.
The eight U.S. representatives include federal agencies," state agencies, 9 and
NGOs. 6° It is currently being facilitated solely by IBWC staff.
48. See Kim Delfino, Salton Sea Restoration: Can there be Salvation for the Sea?, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 157 (2006).
49. The five federal agency members are the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and
Wildlife Service, Geological Survey, and Environmental Protection Agency.
50. The two tribal members are the Torres-Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians, and Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians.
51. The two state agency members are the State Water Resources Control Board, and the Colorado River
Regional Water Quality Control Board.
52. The ten local agency members are the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, San
Diego County Water Authority, Coachella Valley Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, Imperial County,
Riverside County, Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, South Coast Air Quality Management
District, Coachella Valley Association of Governments, and Imperial Valley Association of Governments.
53. The ten NGO members are the Riverside County Farm Bureau, Imperial County Farm Bureau,
Planning and Conservation League, Defenders of Wildlife, California Waterfowl Association, Pacific Institute,
United Anglers of Southern California, Audubon California, Sierra Club, and California Farm Bureau
Federation.
54. The three federal agencies are the Comision Nacional del Agua, Comision Nacional de Areas
Naturales Protegidas, and SEMARNAT-the Secretaria del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales.
55. The three state agencies are the Comision Estatal de Agua de Baja California, Direccion General de
Ecologia de Baja California, and SEFOA-the Secretaria de Fornento Agripecuaria of Baja California.
56. The NGO is Pronatura Sonora.
57. The two local representatives are Edith Santiago and Jesus Mosqueda.
58. The three federal agencies are the Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Upper
Colorado River Commission.
59. The state agency is the Colorado River Board of California. This agency is comprised of members
from Coachella Valley Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power, Palo Verde Irrigation District, San Diego County Water Authority, Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, Department of Water Resources, Department of Fish and Game, and two public members.
60. The four NGOs are the Sonoran Institute, Environmental Defense, Defenders of Wildlife, and
Pacific Institute.
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A quick comparison of the three processes shows that the IBWC Delta
Advisory Group is substantially the smallest of the three groups.6' There is partial
overlap between the U.S. participants in the three processes.62 There is no formal
Mexican participation in either the MSCP or the SSAC.
IV. ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA: TWENTY
ASSUMPTIONS FOR WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS TO TEST
The following working assumptions are based on the author's initial research
and informal interviews. They are offered to workshop participants for their
comment, correction, modification, and supplementation. Results from the
workshop will be used to refocus supplemental research and identify key
stakeholders as part of a more rigorously researched assessment.
A. Do Issues Focus on Fundamental Legal Rights or Societal Values?
Assumption 1: The delta ecosystem directly presents issues involving the
literal survival of water-dependent wildlife species and indigenous communities.
These issues, however, are built into the status quo. That is, without a negotiated
resolution, it is uncertain how the water-dependent wildlife species and
indigenous communities will survive under current law and policy. For these
species and communities, any negotiated solution would have to be an
improvement over the status quo. As such, it would not, however, force parties to
compromise over fundamental values associated with the continued existence of
the species and communities.
Assumption 2: Beyond these fundamental values, there are extremely high
emotions challenging any collaborative. In the wake of the various water
transfers that have occurred recently between agricultural and South Coast urban
users, any talk of reallocating water in the Lower Colorado River-especially if
talk involves letting more water flow to Mexico-will likely trigger substantial
concerns in U.S. river-dependent areas. These emotions will certainly temper
parties' willingness to negotiate and encourage increasing their BATNAs.
61. Although the Colorado River Board of California participates in the IBWC Delta Advisory
Committee on behalf of its ten members, it also participates alongside of many of those members in the MSCP.
Thus, CRB members, Coachella Valley Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Los Angeles Department of Power and Water, San Diego
County Water Authority, and Department of Fish and Game each have their own representatives to the MSCP.
62. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife Service are the only entities directly
represented in all three collaboratives. Counting their representation through the Colorado River Board of
California, Coachella Valley Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, and San Diego County Water Authority are at least
indirectly represented in all three processes. No NGO is represented in all three processes, although two-
Defenders of Wildlife and the Pacific Institute-are represented on both the SSAC and the IBWC Delta
Advisory Committee.
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B. Are There Potential Areas for Agreement, Preferably With Multiple Issues
for Tradeoffs?
Assumption 3: It is unclear whether parties whose best alternative is
preservation of the status quo have a sufficient incentive to negotiate for.
Assumption 4: If there is a sufficient incentive to negotiate, there are multiple
possible management solutions, each with different tradeoffs.
Assumption 5: If there is a sufficient incentive to negotiate, there is sufficient
flexibility in the applicable parts of the law of the river to support whatever
arrangements the parties may reach.
C. Are the Primary Parties Identifiable and Willing to Participate?
Assumption 6: The primary parties are readily identifiable: deal breakers,
deal makers, and impacted parties.
Assumption 7: Although seventeen are directly participating in the current
process (and through membership in the Colorado River Board of California,
seven more are indirectly participating), it is unclear whether they, and the other
parties, would be willing to participate in a more extensive collaborative effort.
Assumption 8: Most of those who stand likely to gain from any improvement
of the delta ecosystem are likely to participate, as their BATNAs are not strong.
Assumption 9: Many of those who see themselves as likely to "lose" from
any improvement of the delta ecosystem will be less willing to participate, as the
status quo will appear better to them than a negotiated solution.
D. Does Each Party Have a Legitimate Spokesperson?
Assumption 10: There are no legitimate spokesperson issues with: the U.S.
and Mexican federal, state, and local agencies; NGOs; and the upstream tribes.
At least one spokesperson for the delta residents is participating in the current
process; others need to be identified.
E. Are the Potential Deal-Breakers at the Table?
Assumption 11: Many, but not all, of the deal breakers are at the table.
Further deal breaker analysis is needed.
F. Does Any Party Have Assurance of a Much Better Deal Elsewhere?
Assumption 12: Many upstream interests will likely perceive the status quo
as a better alternative than any change.
Assumption 13: Any delta negotiations are likely to play out against the more
complicated issues affecting U.S.-Mexican relations, including, but not limited
to, other border water issues.
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G. Do the Parties Anticipate Future Dealings With Each Other?
Assumption 14: The United States and Mexico will obviously have
substantial future dealings with each other, as will many of the individual
agencies and organizations. It is less clear what future dealings parties will have
with delta residents.
H. Is There a Relative Balance of Power Among the Parties?
Assumption 15: Both Mexico and the United States have sufficient leverage
points vis- -vis each other to allow a meaningful negotiation on this issue.
Assumption 16: On at least the U.S. side of the border, the urban and
agricultural interests have sufficient leverage vis-a-vis each other to allow for a
meaningful negotiation on this issue.
Assumption 17: The environmental and social interests, including the
specific interests of delta residents, have had sufficient power to get the process
started. At the start of the second Bush administration, it is not yet clear that they
have a sufficiently strong BATNA to move the negotiations forward very
quickly.
L Are There External Pressures to Reach Agreement?
Assumption 18: The strongest external pressure to reaching agreement is to
preserve the habitat that has arisen as a result of the El Nifio spills and the
agricultural return flows. There are no other external pressures.
J. Is There a Realistic Timetable for Completion?
Assumption 19: There are no timetables yet, realistic or otherwise.
K. Are There Adequate Resources and Funding to Support the Negotiation?
Assumption 20: There are substantial resources available to support a
negotiated process. These include: IBWC staff time; a willingness of NGO and
academic parties to commit, at a minimum, staff time; and a substantial existing
scientific and technical understanding of the key habitat areas and possible
management solutions. There will certainly need to be substantial additional
resources made available to fill data gaps, develop and test solutions, and provide
process support. It is unclear where those resources will come from.
V. CONCLUSION-NEXT STEPS
Following the workshop, the Institute for Sustainable Development will
undertake a more formal assessment of the potential for a collaborative approach
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to Colorado River Delta ecosystem restoration. Based on the insights and
suggestions of workshop participants, the author will design a research strategy
and list of interviewees. Research and interviews will take place in the spring of
2007. The report detailing the results of the assessment will be written in the
summer of 2007. In the fall of 2007, the report will be offered to participants for
comment and submitted for publication.
